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Abstract 
The harmonization of the tax regime of EU Member States represents one possible way to intensify their economic integration. 
Tax harmonization by a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base constitutes a similar system to which has been used in 
Canada, USA or Switzerland since the last century. The present paper describes the principles of formulas apportionment which 
are used in Canada and the USA and proves different distribution of the tax base in comparison with the formula apportionment 
as published in the proposal to the Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base of 16 March 2011. 
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1. Introduction 
The harmonization of the tax regime of EU Member States represents one possible way to intensify their 
economic integration. On the other hand, the tax system of each country can differ in relation to its economic or 
social structure, and certain types of taxes can perform different roles in the national tax system. 
As Salin (2007) says, the idea of tax harmonization is often associated with the concept of a globalized tax 
system, which represents something like a worldwide tax system with cooperation of tax administration. But 
globalization means competitiveness at a global level. In the other words, individuals try to differentiate from each 
other at the global level, not to be more and more similar. Therefore, if we want to have a globalized tax system, it 
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has nothing to do with tax harmonization, but it means an existence of tax differences in terms of tax competition. 
Also, McLure (2007) argues that a reasonable level of tax competition may strengthen the fiscal discipline of 
Member States and constantly reduce tax obstacles. On the contrary Dankó (2012) says that tax harmonization with 
common rules of determination of the tax base could contribute to the fiscal sustainability and the competitiveness of 
European business 
As mentioned in Gordon (2011), according to the European Commission the only way of tax harmonization is 
implementation of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB hereinafter), which would be able to 
eliminate tax obstacles arising from cross-border business activities. Tax harmonization by the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base constitutes a similar system to which has been used in Canada, the USA or 
Switzerland since the last century. The present paper describes the principles of formulas apportionment which are 
used in Canada and the USA and proves different distribution of the tax base in comparison with the formulary 
apportionment as published in the proposal to the Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
of 16 March 2011. 
The article is divided into three main parts. The main principles of Canadian and U.S. formula apportionment as 
well as European formula apportionment based on the proposal Directive are described in Theoretical background. 
The core results of the investigation are represented in Results. The main ideas and finding are summarized in 
Conclusion. 
2. Theoretical background 
The proposal to the Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base of 16 March 2011 defines 
general rules such as realization principle, principle of measurability, consistency and principle of one tax year. 
CCCTB will be used by company groups with a high degree of economic dependence which will meet the criterion 
of 50 % voting rights and 75 % capital share or the right to profit. CCCTB will also only be applied by enterprises 
which are operating within the EU, i.e. water's edge principle. This basically means consolidation of company group 
income with a source on the territory of the European Union. An income with a source in third country will be taxed 
by the rules of the country where the company is based. 
Three basic steps were defined for CCCTB determination in the proposal Directive. First of all each company 
calculates its taxable profit based on accounting principles, this taxable profit will be adjusted according to the 
requirements of CCCTB. For example all intercompany transaction should be eliminated. As Petutsching (2010) 
describes, the consolidated tax base will be redistributed among the EU Member States on whose territory the 
company group operates. The distribution of the tax base will be based on three economic factors: the reported 
tangible assets, payrolls as a number of employees in connection with labor costs and sales. The destination 
principle will be used for sales. All intangible and financial assets will be excluded; it is possible that countries with 
a large share of services will be disadvantaged, on the other hand countries with labor-intensive industries will 
benefit from formula apportionment. By the proposal Directive all factors in formula apportionment should be 
calculated with equal proportion. If there is a missing factor a higher portion of others would be used. There is also 
the possibility for some special formulas like in Canada, for example in finance sector or freight transportation.  
By Mintz (2007) the CCCTB could reduce the overall tax base of company group due to possible loss offsetting 
between them. As mentioned in Devereux and Loretz (2007) this would be allowed only in a year where the loss is 
reported. But in the case of overall loss of company group it would be allowed to carry it forward. By Mintz (2007) 
the Member States will impose their own tax rate to avoid any disruption of their fiscal sovereignty. The countries 
will have direct control of tax revenues and tax administration. As Devereux and Lorets (2008) note, the revenue 
from new investment made by company group will be taxed by an average rate based on the tax rate of countries 
where the company group is based. 
As Mintz (2007) says, the CCCTB system with consolidation is more similar to the system applied in the USA, 
the alternative Common Corporate Tax Base is closer to the Canadian system which allows companies to decide for 
consolidation or not. By Fuest et al. (2006) the Canadian and the U.S. model are significantly different in the 
allocation of taxable income. By Cline and Neubig et al. (2010) in Canada there is formula apportionment for 
income distribution of legal entity which operates by permanent establishment in different provinces, but in USA is 
formula apportionment used for income distribution of company group. The findings of Hellerstein and McLure’s 
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(2004)1 study prove a significant difference in formulas apportionment used in the States and in Canada. These are 
caused by using a different proportion of factors in the formula or their presence in the formula. According to 
Wiener (2005), the Canadian model could be a good example of uniformity for the European Union, whilst the U.S. 
model is more an example of what the EU should avoid. 
By Nerudová (2011) the initial Canadian approach was based on the presence of a permanent establishment 
(hereinafter PE). If a company had PEs in several provinces, it was necessary to reallocate the overall taxable 
income between them. Those provinces on whose territory company management was located were often favoured. 
As mentioned in Weiner (2005), common income allocation rules are determined by the Tax Rental Agreements; 
firstly approved only by seven Canadian provinces. By 1961 the formula apportionment was adopted by all 
provinces, but nowadays Ontario, Alberta and Quebec are no longer part of the agreement, even though they follow 
federal rules on the definition of taxable income.  
Fuest et al (2006) note that the tax base is defined at the federal level, but each province imposes its own tax rate. 
Actually they can also adopt different tax allowances or incentives. Tax rates range from 9.2 % in Quebec to 17 % 
in New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Manitoba or Saskatchewan. Accortidng to Mintz and Smart (2004) some 
provinces also impose different tax rates for specific industries. Canada does not allow consolidation of the tax base 
of multinational companies which operate in the provinces through separate affiliates. Therefore these companies 
often move profits from the high tax provinces (such as British Columbia) to those with a low tax rate (such as 
Quebec). These practices could increase the elasticity of taxable income and reduce the sensitivity of investment 
decisions based on differences in tax rates. As some defense against these tax planning practices some restrictive 
rules were introduced, such as the impossibility of deducting interest cost if the debt of the company is higher than 
the reported amount of assets. 
Nowadays Canada uses a formula apportionment with equal proportion of payroll and sales with destination 
principle. By Mintz (2007) the choice of these two factors should reflect the range of economic activity carried out 
in a particular province. On the contrary by Fuest et al. (2006) these are not associated with capital gains, as would 
be also with assets as a formula factor. As mentioned in Wiener (2005), special types of formula apportionment are 
used for insurance companies, banks, lending companies, railways, crop companies, freight transportation, shipping 
or pipelines. If the company operates in several sectors at the same time, it should choose a formula apportionment 
based on activity from which it receives the major portion of its overall profit.  
In the USA a formula apportionment was initially introduced in the 19th century for the purpose of property and 
capital gains taxation of the transnational rail network. The overall value of property was distributed based on share 
of each country of federation on the transnational rail network.  
In 1911 Wisconsin started to levy corporate income tax with an application of formula apportionment. As an 
argument for this decision was introduced that is not possible to calculate an individual profit of each firm in 
company group. In 1913 a federal corporate income tax was introduced. In 1920 the U.S. Supreme Court fully 
implemented a formula apportionment for manufacturing companies with tangible assets as only one factor. As 
mentioned in Weiner (2005), according to the research by the National Tax Association in 1938, most countries 
prefer to use a distribution model based on the formula apportionment system before the separate accounting 
system. 
A first common formula apportionment, known as the Massachusetts formula, was introduced in 1933. It was 
based on three equally weighted factors, namely payroll, sales and tangible assets. States of the federation have more 
freedom in choosing the formula factors and may also affect the structure of the tax base.  
By Mintz (2007) in recent years most states replaced the Massachusetts formula with formulas with a larger 
proportion of sales in an effort to promote higher employment in the States. But as mentioned in Fuest et al. (2006), 
an application of different formula factors could easily lead to double taxation. This is also in accordance with the 
finding of the study by Devine et al. (2006) which says if there is any difference in determination of formula 
apportionment it extends the space for the influence of the tax base. On the other hand in the case of uniform 
definition of formula apportionment no situation of double taxation should appear. 
 
 
1 In Wiener, 2005 
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Most states use a Double Weighted Sales formula, with double portion of sales factor. Nine states of federation 
still only use the Massachusetts method, Louisiana and Missouri apply both methods.  
Anand and Sansing (2000)2 in their study investigate why some states still prefer the Massachusetts method, 
while others prefer only sales formula apportionment. Their finding says the choice of formula apportionment 
reflects the mobility of industry which prevails in the respective country.  
Nine states consider sales with destination principle as only one factor in their formula for all or some specific 
sectors. Two states apply their own formula with 90 %, respectively 96 %, proportion of sales. Ohio applies a Triple 
Weighted Sales model where sales are counted three times. According to a study of Runkel and Schjelderup (2007) 
for states in a decentralized federal system it is more favorable to choose not only mobile but also immobile factors 
for their formula apportionment. On the contrary by Edmiston (2002)3 for all states it would be the most appropriate 
to apply only sales formula regardless which one is chosen by other country. Another finding of Runkel and 
Schjelderup (2007) is that the choice of formula factors and tax rates has a big influence on volume and efficiency of 
public goods.  
In connection with the application sales formula factor with destination principle some states use the rule of 
return to avoid nowhere income situations. But by Cline and Neubig (2010) a number of states do not apply this rule 
because of its affect on economic competitiveness. In the USA there are some special formulas which are applied in 
some sectors, for example in financial services where the tax base is distributed by the risk factor. 
Nowadays there is an effort to reform the U.S. taxation principles for multinational companies. The most 
dissatisfaction is expressed toward the high costs and incompleteness of the current system. The proposed reform is 
associated with an application of formula apportionment also for distribution of tax base generated by multinational 
companies. By Clausing and Lahav (2011) it could eliminate tax disadvantages for companies based in the USA, 
reduce administrative costs and restrict profit shifting methods. 
3. Results 
The literature background describes the main signs of formulas apportionment which are used in Canada and the 
USA and also the principles of formula apportionment as published in the proposal to the Council Directive on 
a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base of 16 March 2011. Moreover it was also mentioned how important 
role formula’s factor can play and also the importance of the type of formula. In this part European, Canadian and 
American formula apportionment will be applied to real data of a company group which operates in the European 
Union with respecting the water's edge principle. The investigation was made on data of AGC Flat Glass Czech Ltd. 
This company is part of the worldwide concern AGC Group, which also operates in North and Latin America and in 
Asia. AGC Flat Glass Czech Ltd.; is the largest producer of flat glass and its applications in Central and Eastern 
Europe. On the territory of the European Union it has 18 subsidiaries, nine of them in the Czech Republic, one in 
Estonia, one in Hungary, one in Slovakia and six in Poland. The activities of the subsidiaries by the NACE Codes4 
fall not only to production sector but also to trade sector, educational sector, and entertainment industry or sports 
activities5. This company group was selected with respect to the long-term research target of the author. All data was 
taken from the Amadeus database, missing values were imputed by regression imputation based on NACE Codes. 
All data refer to the year 2011; therefore the U.S. formulas apportionment and their application by individual states 
are valid for the year 20116. The following table (Table. 1) provides an overview of the formulary apportionment 
used in Canada and the USA in 2011 and 2013 and the formula apportionment by the proposal Directive. 
 
 
 
2In Wiener (2005) 
3 Ibid. 
4 By European Industrial Activity Classification on website of Central Statistic Office Ireland 
5 NACE Code no. 23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products; NACE Code no. 46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; NACE Code no. 85 Education and NACE Code no. 93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 
6 Available from Federation of Tax Administration 
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Table 1. Table of formula apportionment 
 2011 2013 
European 
Union 
3 factors - 1/3 assets, 1/3 sales, 1/6 
cost of employees, 1/6 number of 
employees 
For all member states For all member states 
Canada 2 factors -1/2 sales, 1/2 payroll Nunavut, North Territories, British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island 
no change 
United States 
of America7 
Massachusetts formula - 3 factors - 
1/3 sales, 1/3 property resp. assets, 
1/3 payroll 
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
District of Columbia, 
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Montana, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island 
Double weighted Sales 3 factors - 
1/2 sales, 1/4 property resp. assets, 
1/4 payroll 
Alabama, Arizona**, Arkansas, 
California ***, Connecticut***, Florida, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland ***, 
Massachusetts ***, New Mexico*, New 
Jersey, New Hampshire, North California, 
South Carolina***, Tennessee, Vermont, 
West Virginia, Virginia ***, Utah*, 
Alabama, Arizona**, 
Arkansas, Connecticut***, 
Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Maryland ***, Massachusetts 
***, New Hampshire, North 
California, Tennessee, 
Vermont, West Virginia, 
Virginia ***, District of 
Columbia 
Sales - single sales factor Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas*, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Mississippi (1), Missouri*, 
Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Texas, 
Wisconsin 
California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana*, Maine, Michigan, 
Mississippi (1), Missouri*, 
Nebraska, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Texas, Utah, Wisconsin 
Triple weighted Sales 3 factor 3/5 
sales, 1/5 property resp. assets , 1/5 
payroll 
Ohio Ohio 
No State Income Tax Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, 
Wyoming 
Nevada, South Dakota, 
Washington, Wyoming 
9/10 sales, 1/20 property resp. 
assets 1/20 payroll 
Minnesota, Pennsylvania New Jersey 
48/50 sales, 1/50 property resp. 
assets, 1/50 payroll 
 Minnesota 
As can be seen in the table (Table 1) from 2011 to 2013 there were several changes in choice of formula 
apportionment by States. The most interesting thing is that states like New Mexico or Kansas for the tax year 2013 
again use the Massachusetts formula.  
There were five different formulas apportionment involved in the investigation, namely the Canadian formula 
apportionment, the U.S. Massachusetts formula, the Double Weighted Sales formula and the Single Sales formula. 
Distribution of taxable income was calculated with consideration of possible loss offsetting within a company group.  
When we apply different formula apportionment to the same data, differences can be observed in the share of 
taxable income distributed to the individual company. These differences are mainly caused by the use of different 
formula factors and their proportions in the formula. The following tables (Table 2 and Table 3) show the 
differences in the proportions of taxable income allocated to individual subsidiaries. The differences are always 
 
 
7 Further comments to formulary apportionment in USA:* a state also uses the Massachusetts formula; ** a state also uses specific formula as 90 
% of sales factor, 10 % of property factor and 10 % of payroll; *** a state also uses the Single sales formula or the triple weighted sales formula; 
(1) a state uses specific formula based on specific type of business. 
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related to the share of taxable income allocated to the respective subsidiaries by EU formula apportionment and also 
to the current system based on separate accounting. In the following text formula apportionment will be referred as 
FA. All values are referred in thousands EUR (hereinafter th EUR). The table of data for investigation can be seen in 
Appendix A.  
Table 2. Distribution of taxable income within subsidiaries by the different formula apportionment 
Subsidiary 
– Country 
ISO code 
NACE 
code 
Current 
system 
base on 
separated 
accounting 
in th EUR 
CCCTB 
in th 
EUR 
difference 
of CCCTB 
FA and the 
current 
system in 
th EUR 
The 
Canadian 
FA in th 
EUR 
difference 
of the 
Canadian 
FA and 
CCCTB 
FA in th 
EUR 
difference 
of the 
Canadian 
FA and 
Current 
system in 
th EUR 
The 
Massachusetts 
FA in th EUR 
difference of 
the 
Massachusetts 
FA and 
CCCTB FA in 
th EUR 
difference of 
the 
Massachuset
ts FA and 
the current 
system in th 
EUR 
CZ 8532 −13.33 11.82 25.15 7.70 −4.12 21.03 12.06 0.24 25.39 
CZ 2312 111.04 38.84 −72.21 30.50 −8.33 −80.54 39.85 1.01 −71.20 
CZ 2312 187.90 81.26 −106.64 71.38 −9.88 −116.52 80.10 −1.16 −107.81 
CZ 2312 3009.22 905.48 −2103.74 736.40 −169.08 −2272.82 913.21 7.73 −2096.01 
CZ 2312 −916.89 129.69 1046.58 112.54 −17.15 1029.43 128.34 −1.35 1045.22 
CZ 9311 −538.13 47.89 586.03 14.14 −33.75 552.27 48.13 0.24 586.26 
CZ 2312 70.08 14.74 −55.33 13.99 −0.75 −56.09 14.73 −0.01 −55.34 
CZ 2312 −229.80 9.53 239.34 5.17 −4.37 234.97 9.75 0.22 239.55 
CZ 2312 −65.04 19.63 84.67 15.95 −3.68 80.99 19.45 −0.17 84.49 
EE 4613 15.77 1.75 −14.02 1.89 0.14 −13.87 1.91 0.16 −13.86 
HU 4644 11.95 0.95 −11.00 1.46 0.51 −10.49 1.02 0.07 −10.93 
PL 4690 21.26 508.61 487.35 749.69 241.09 728.44 502.47 −6.14 481.21 
PL 2312 −85.71 60.38 146.09 72.74 12.35 158.45 60.82 0.44 146.53 
PL 4690 562.44 6.36 −556.09 9.43 3.07 −553.02 6.28 −0.07 −556.16 
PL 2312 47.94 25.04 −22.90 28.21 3.17 −19.73 24.80 −0.24 −23.14 
PL 2312 152.88 53.14 −99.74 52.62 −0.52 −100.26 52.20 −0.94 −100.68 
PL 2312 −154.69 27.96 182.65 26.01 −1.95 180.70 27.43 −0.52 182.12 
SK 2312 −195.25 48.59 243.84 41.84 −6.76 237.08 49.10 0.51 244.35 
It can be seen from the tables (Table 2 and Table 3) in the case of formula apportionment with possible loss 
offsetting within a company group, which is also in accordance with formula apportionment in the proposal 
Directive, overall profit is also distributed to these subsidiaries which are unprofitable in the current system of 
separate accounting. Basically it seems that the profit of the most profitable subsidiary (on the fourth line in Table 2 
and Table 3) is distributed to others due to formula apportionment. This result is consistent with Petutschnig (2010) 
who says that tax income which would be taxed under the current system of separate accounting is not the same as 
the proportion of taxable income distributed to each company. Only if there was no unprofitable subsidiary and no 
possibility of loss offsetting could be these shares equal. The change in share of allocated profit when formula 
apportionment is applied is almost comparable in the case of all formulas.  
When we compare CCCTB formula apportionment and the Canadian method it is obvious from the table 
(Table 2) that the largest decline in the taxable income share is in the case of manufacturing companies. This is 
probably caused by the fact that the Canadian method does not reflect tangible assets, instead of that it uses 50 % 
proportion of sales and 50 % of payroll factor. The largest increase in the proportion of taxable income can be seen 
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for the Polish subsidiaries (on the twelfth line in Table 2) operating in trade sector, although its operating turnover is 
not high, it reports the highest payroll.  
It can also be observed that there is very small difference between the CCCTB FA and U.S. Massachusetts 
method in the table (Table 2). These results are not surprising because of the fact that the only one difference of 
CCCTB FA and the Massachusetts model is that CCCTB considers payroll factor in combination with number of 
employees. 
Table 3. Distribution of taxable income within subsidiaries by the different formula apportionment 
Subsidiary 
– Country 
ISO code 
NACE 
code 
Current 
system base 
on 
separated 
accounting 
in th EUR 
CCCTB 
in th EUR 
USA 
Double 
Weighted 
Sales FA 
in th 
EUR 
difference 
of USA 
Double 
Weighted 
Sales FA 
and 
CCCTB FA 
in th EUR 
difference 
of USA 
Double 
Weighted 
FA and the 
current 
system in 
the EUR 
USA 
Single 
Sales FA in 
th EUR 
difference 
of USA 
Single 
Sales FA 
and 
CCCTB FA 
in th EUR 
difference 
of USA 
Single 
Sales FA 
and the 
current 
system in 
th EUR 
CZ 8532 −13.33 11.82 11.06 −0.75 24.40 8.07 −3.75 21.40 
CZ 2312 111.04 38.84 42.15 3.32 −68.89 49.07 10.24 −61.97 
CZ 2312 187.90 81.26 88.83 7.57 −99.07 115.04 33.78 −72.86 
CZ 2312 3009.22 905.48 974.05 68.57 −2035.17 1156.56 251.08 −1852.66 
CZ 2312 −916.89 129.69 140.10 10.41 1056.98 175.38 45.69 1092.27 
CZ 9311 −538.13 47.89 41.93 −5.97 580.06 23.31 −24.58 561.45 
CZ 2312 70.08 14.74 16.59 1.85 −53.48 22.18 7.44 −47.90 
CZ 2312 −229.80 9.53 9.46 −0.08 239.26 8.57 −0.97 238.37 
CZ 2312 −65.04 19.63 21.36 1.73 86.40 27.09 7.46 92.13 
EE 4613 15.77 1.75 1.99 0.24 −13.78 2.23 0.48 −13.54 
HU 4644 11.95 0.95 1.27 0.33 −10.68 2.04 1.09 −9.91 
PL 4690 21.26 508.61 377.87 −130.74 356.61 4.08 −504.53 −17.18 
PL 2312 −85.71 60.38 77.47 17.09 163.18 127.42 67.04 213.14 
PL 4690 562.44 6.36 9.42 3.06 −553.02 18.82 12.47 −543.62 
PL 2312 47.94 25.04 30.37 5.33 −17.58 47.06 22.02 −0.88 
PL 2312 152.88 53.14 61.86 8.72 −91.02 90.82 37.68 −62.06 
PL 2312 −154.69 27.96 31.78 3.82 186.47 44.83 16.87 199.52 
SK 2312 −195.25 48.59 54.09 5.50 249.34 69.07 20.48 264.32 
Regarding the comparison of CCCTB FA and U.S. formula apportionment with higher weight of sale factor (in 
Table 3), the Double weighted Sale model distributes a higher proportion of taxable income especially to these 
companies with a higher reported turnover. The largest decline in the proportion of taxable income can be reported 
to, as already mentioned the Polish subsidiary, which reports low sales in relation to the number of employees and 
payroll. Basically the same could be also seen in the case of Single Sales FA. This formula with greater weighted 
sales distributes shares of taxable income especially to manufacturing companies with high turnover. Single Sales 
FA also distributes a larger share of taxable income to all subsidiaries in comparison with CCCTB FA. 
The proportion of taxable income distributed to each country in which the company operates can be seen from 
the following figure (Fig. 1). Here it should also be mentioned that each country imposes its own tax rate so as not to 
distort its fiscal autonomy.  
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Fig. 1. Distribution of share of taxable income under the different formula apportionment 
The U.S. Single Sales formula apportionment distributes the largest share of taxable income to the country where 
the parent company is based. The smallest share of taxable profit belongs to the home country in the case of the 
Canadian formula apportionment. This is probably due to the fact that there is no tangible assets factor in its 
formula, which has probably these home state companies the most. It could be clear that the proportions of taxable 
income distributed to Estonia and Poland are too small in the case of every formula apportionment method, and it is 
not possible to observe them in Fig. 1. On the contrary, in the current system of separate accounting the proportion 
of income taxed in Poland is almost one quarter. There are also significant changes in the taxable income share 
distributed to Slovakia. This subsidiary is in fifth place in terms of tangible assets. If there is a decrease in the 
proportion of this factor there is also a decrease in the share of taxable income for this subsidiary. In the current 
system the Slovak subsidiary is unprofitable; in this case an application of formula apportionment brings tax 
revenues to the Slovakian national budget.  
The share of taxable income distributed to individual countries has a big influence on tax revenues. Tax revenues 
are also influenced by the rate of tax levied on taxable income. For example in the case of the Czech Republic the 
highest tax revenues are provided in the current system. Although the calculation is based on the data of one 
company group and it is impossible to generalize this result, the effect of a new system on budget revenues could be 
quite interesting question for further investigation. It is possible to conclude that the factors and their weight in 
formula models may largely affect the tax revenues. 
4. Conclusion 
The main objective of this article is a comparison of formulas apportionment which are used in Canada and the 
USA with a European formula apportionment based on the proposal Directive. The theoretical background deals 
with the definition of the main features of these formulas apportionment. In addition it also provides some historical 
information and presents some results of empirical investigation focused on the testing of convenience of factors 
involved into formula apportionment or different formulas. In the practical part different formulas apportionment are 
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applied on real data of a group company operating on the territory of European Union. The selection of data 
corresponds with the long-term research target of the author. All data refer to tax period in 2011 and were taken 
from the Amadeus database.  
The results indicate that the formula apportionment with possible loss offsetting leads to distribution of profit to 
those subsidiaries which are unprofitable in the current system of separate accounting. Regarding differences of 
formulas apportionment, the smallest differences are between CCCTB formulas apportionment with the 
Massachusetts method. This is not surprising because both methods involve the same formula factors only with the 
difference that payrolls calculated for CCCTB FA are related to number of employees.  
In a comparison of CCCTB FA and the Canadian model it can be seen the biggest decrease in the share of 
income distributed to manufacturing companies is in the Canadian method. This is probably caused by the fact that 
the Canadian model does not consider any assets as a formula factor, but these types of companies own the main 
proportion of it.  
If we compare the distribution of share of income for individual countries, the largest shares to the home country 
which means the country where parent company is based, is distributed if we apply the U.S. Single Sales method. 
This could be supporting reasons why this method is widely applied in the United States. There is also an interesting 
finding for the Slovak subsidiary, which is unprofitable in the current system of separate accounting, but shares 
quite an important proportion of income if we apply formula apportionment.  
To the question of tax revenues; the highest tax revenues are reported to the home state country in the current 
system. It is probably caused by the fact that current system does not allow consolidation of profits or loss offsetting 
within them. On the other hand, it is very important to know how a new system of formula apportionment will affect 
budget revenues. As conclusion of the investigation in this paper the presence or proportion of formula factors can 
significantly affect overall tax revenues and the final decision about implementation of the Directive on CCCTB 
should be based mainly on the impact of the new system on budget revenues. 
Appendix A. Table of data of subsidiary companies of ACG Flat Glass Czech, Ltd. 
Subsidiary - 
BvD ID 
number 
Subsidiary 
- Country 
ISO code 
Company name NACE 
code 
Operating 
revenue 
(Turnover) 
th EUR 
(Rate at last 
closing 
date) 2011 
Costs of 
employees 
th EUR 
2011 
Number 
of 
employees 
2011  
Tangible 
fixed 
assets th 
EUR 
2011 
P/L before 
tax 
th EUR 
2011 
CZ18385877 CZ STŘEDNÍ ŠKOLA TECHNICKÁ 
AGC, Ltd. 
8532 982.23 701.58 38.00 1136.84 −13.33 
CZ18609627 CZ AGC STOD, Inc. 2312 5972.47 1143.20 38.00 3201.04 111.04 
CZ18811124 CZ AGC FENESTRA, Ltd. 2312 14001.35 2656.16 225.00 5333.26 187.90 
CZ25012240 CZ AGC AUTOMOTIVE CZECH, 
Ltd. 
2312 140759.08 30307.82 1750.00 69272.08 3009.22 
CZ25012266 CZ AGC PROCESSING TEPLICE, 
Ltd. 
2312 21344.77 4762.99 375.00 8745.11 −916.89 
CZ25028715 CZ FK TEPLICE, Ltd. 9311 2837.36 476.27 23.00 6349.13 −538.13 
CZ25266306 CZ AGC HRADEC KRÁLOVÉ, Ltd. 2312 2699.32 555.88 38.00 886.77 70.08 
CZ47784512 CZ AGC LIBEREC, Inc. 2312 1042.78 169.30 3.00 1034.48 −229.80 
CZ60714778 CZ AGC MORAVSKÉ 
BUDĚJOVICE, Inc. 
2312 3297.16 460.92 38.00 1446.65 −65.04 
EE10996093 EE AGC FLAT GLASS BALTIC OÜ 4613 270.91 149.51 4.00 105.53 15.77 
HU12866625 HU AGC FLAT GLASS HUNGARY 
KERESKEDELMI KORLÁTOLT 
FELELŐSSÉGŰ TÁRSASÁG 
VÉGELSZÁMOLÁS ALATT 
4644 247.70 84.86 3.00 7.12 11.95 
PL010403670 PL AGC FLAT-GLASS POLSKA, Inc 4690 496.18 143306.38 9936.73 437.83 21.26 
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PL010940942 PL AGC WARSZAWA, Ltd. 2312 15508.03 1729.85 100.00 2022.49 −85.71 
PL015260258 PL AGC FALENICA, Inc., in 
liquidation 
4690 2290.94 2.94 3.00 0.00 562.44 
PL190926780 PL AGC GDAŃSK, Inc. 2312 5727.57 897.60 70.00 983.09 47.94 
PL830228982 PL AGC OPATÓW, Inc. 2312 11053.71 1381.12 130.00 2808.83 152.88 
PL890654347 PL AGC SILESIA, Inc. 2312 5455.96 688.41 67.00 1656.12 −154.69 
SK30999201 SK AGC TRENČÍN, Inc. 2312 8406.46 1399.26 75.00 3479.22 −195.25 
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